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Although Goldie and Schellekens edited an earlier collection of philosophical essays on
Conceptual art (OUP, 2007), this is the first book-length consideration of Conceptual art in the
history of philosophy.  Given the influence of philosophy on much of 20  century art, and theth
challenge to aesthetics and philosophy of art of much of 20  century art - and arguably ofth
Conceptual art in particular - to say that such an examination is overdue is a gross
understatement.  One could then praise Goldie and Schellekens simply for their undertaking,
even if it were not thought to be particularly successful.  However, this book is thoughtful,
informative, and provocative, and it can be recommended to artists, art critics, art historians, and
other members of the artworld in addition to philosophers and aestheticians.  Supplemented by
material appropriate to the level, it would work well in either an introductory or an advanced
course in philosophy of art.
Conceptual art is both a challenge to common notions of what art is, and how art is to be
defined, if it can be defined.  The authors recognize that these challenges are an important part of
the point of Conceptual art in saying that “a conceptual artwork can be conceived as an enacted
thought experiment, set up to challenge the accepted boundaries of the concept of art.” (15).  It is
implicit in that remark that Conceptual artists act with an intention that is informed not only by
the history of art, but by the recognition of art’s capacity to investigate itself and to raise
philosophical questions.  Accordingly, “to be a conceptual artist you must be knowing” (16, their
italics), and, although Conceptual artworks are multifarious, an artwork must have a degree of
self-reflectiveness about art and its practices and possibilities to be Conceptual.  Self-
reflectiveness is something that Conceptual art has in common with Greenbergian Modernism,
but the self-reflectiveness that is manifested in Modernism’s concern with medium-specificity
and medium-purity is rejected by Conceptual art.  In fact, what are media in traditional art
become for the authors mere means in Conceptual art, where “the medium is the idea.” (24, their
italics)  Although Conceptual artworks can use such things as photography, film, video, actions,
and language, “these means of production are mere means” (24), “the medium of conceptual art
is ideas, and any physical presence is merely the means by which the artist lets us gain access to
his ideas.” (60, their italics)  Since a medium in the traditional sense “is what mediates our
aesthetic appreciation,” (75, their italics) Conceptual art is “anti-medium” (75), in the sense that
its means of production “are not the proper objects of aesthetic appreciation,” (24) and
appreciation of a Conceptual artwork “. . . will draw just on the ideas as medium . . .” (78)  Thus
Robert Barry’s language All the things I know but of which I am not at the moment thinking, 1:36
PM, June 15, 1969 is merely the means of acquainting us with Barry’s idea, which is the work’s
medium, and on which its appreciation is based.  
While it can be accepted that ideas can be media, it is not clear why what the authors are
calling “means” cannot just as easily be understood as media, with the idea that is central to
Conceptual art being intimately related to, or a product of the media, in being the content of the
work, or even the work itself; why an idea as a medium could not combine with another medium,
such as language, in a mixed-media work; why a medium must be the means rather than a means
of mediating aesthetic appreciation, with the “background discourse” (33) that the authors
recognize as relevant to Conceptual work (127); and why, in Conceptual art, the means of
production and the idea as a medium - if these things are kept separate - cannot together be
understood to be relevant to aesthetic appreciation, at least in certain works.  It seems difficult
then to make the kind of general statement about the relation of means and medium in
Conceptual art made by the authors.  Another problem is that it is not always clear just what the
idea of a Conceptual work is, or that there is but one idea identified or associated with a work. 
Just what the idea of Barry’s All the things I know . . . is is debatable.  If the idea is supposed to
mediate appreciation, (75, 78) and we’re not sure what the idea is, then it is not clear how
appreciation can be mediated.  And if the same artwork could support more than one idea, then
how would one adjudicate between appreciation of conflicting ideas?  In addition, how does the
idea as medium relate to artistic intention when the artistic means will support the identification
of the medium with more than one idea?  Finally, just what is a work of Conceptual art such as
Barry’s?  Can an idea as medium and a work be identical?  If a work such as Barry’s is not an
idea in any conventional sense of idea, and yet the idea is the medium of the work, then how does
the idea as medium relate to the work?  The authors suggest that “the idea   . . . is the medium by
which the message [of the work] is communicated.” (93)  But now we need to know how the
medium succeeds in conveying the message; how these things relate to artistic intention and
audience interpretation; and how the message of the work is related to the work itself.  Such
considerations underline the depth and complexity of the epistemological and ontological
challenges of Conceptual art emphasized by the authors, and pertain too to their recognition of
the challenge of Conceptual art to the traditional notion of aesthetics and art appreciation. 
However the foregoing issues are to be resolved, it can be recognized that the emphasis of
Conceptual art is on ideas, not objects (in the common sense); on conception, not perception; on
things to be intellectually apprehended and thought about, not to be seen and felt.  The authors
call this “the idea idea” (33) and it leads to the Lippard-Chandler notion of ‘the dematerialization
of the artwork.’ (59)  Both the idea idea and dematerialization link naturally to language, and
understanding and appreciating the self-reflective, ideational, and immaterial works of
Conceptual art depend on language that informs one of things that, though independent of works,
are relevant to them.  Accordingly, such works are “discourse dependent” (29).  The discourse on
which works of Conceptual art depend may, like philosophy, occur at a very high level, even
being “esoteric, in the sense that the required background knowledge isn’t available to a
generally well-informed viewer from direct experience of the work, or even the title of the work .
. .” (29).  Indeed.  This discourse dependence might be seen as part of the point of Conceptual art,
or to be an unavoidable consequence of its nature.  It may oppose the traditional notion of the
aesthetic, or to contribute to a different notion of the aesthetic.  
Goldie and Schellekens consider three possible approaches to the aesthetic in relation to
Conceptual art.  The first, that they call “contra aesthetics” following Timothy Binkley, maintains
that Conceptual art means to avoid “aesthetic traditionalism” - the second approach - where
aesthetic pleasure results from perception.  The contra-aesthetic approach delivers artistic value
that is intellectual, not affective, but that is important, and may be more valuable than traditional
aesthetic experiences.  Applying aesthetic traditionalism to Conceptual art will either fail by
rejecting it, in opposition to informed opinion, (95) or will fail by using a notion of the aesthetic
that is either irrelevant, as in contra aesthetics, or is too parochial in excluding the ideas of 
“aesthetic idealism” - the third approach.  Since ideas may have aesthetic value, works of
Conceptual art may be aesthetic in virtue of their ideas.  Accordingly, the dematerialization of a
Conceptual artwork does not prevent its being aesthetic if its idea(s) is intellectually appreciated. 
(104-106)  
These are complicated and contestable issues, and as the notion of the aesthetic is
widened to include the intellectual, it might be broadened further to include any non-traditional
artistic property in virtue of which a work is thought to be art-historically important.  Thus it may
be thought, as Strawson might maintain, that because of a conceptual linkage between an artistic
property and the art-historical recognition and appreciation of that property, the contra aesthetic
becomes aesthetic.  A ‘contra-aesthetic aesthetic’ could collapse into aesthetic idealism though
when a non-traditional property in virtue of which an artwork was thought to be historically
important was ideational, not perceptual, intellectual, not emotional.  
After pointing out things of deep philosophical interest about Conceptual art, and how it
might be approached aesthetically, the authors claim that the intellectual dimension of
Conceptual art limits it, and it cannot compete with masterpieces of painting and sculpture given
their affective and humanistic dimensions.  And Conceptual art doesn’t “have the resources to
address the shared aesthetic responses and pleasures which traditional art affords.” (135)  Here
one may wonder, in Ducassian fashion, how for any criterion that is being used to place one kind
of art form, aesthetic property, or experience above another, one would defend the use of that
criterion rather than simply assuming its legitimacy.  And one might say, as Milton Babbitt
would, that Conceptual art is for the specialist, as is an abstruse proof in mathematics, and there
is no need to apologize for that.
The very complicated matters of the previous paragraphs provide fertile ground for future
dialogue.  It would be a very good thing were this little volume to prompt further work in the
philosophy of Conceptual art and the questions that it raises, and one would hope that the authors
- individually or together - will contribute further to inquiry in this area.    
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